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Abstract 
In light of the recent economic downfall, there has been significant media 
coverage on the topic of fair value accounting.  There are many critics of the 
accounting rule, who place blame on it for the destruction of billions of dollars in 
capital between financial institutions.  Other commentators, however, see the rule 
as necessary and applaud its ability to bring the turmoil in the economy into the 
spotlight promptly so that it could be addressed effectively.  This paper will begin 
by conducting a study of fair-value accounting from its inception in previous 
standards and then follow it through to Statement No. 157. I will then discuss the 
SEC’s most recent study of FAS157 and their decision as a result of the study.  
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Introduction 
Today’s economy is at its worst level since the Great Depression occurred in 1929.  
While there has never been a formalized definition of a depression or recession, 
economists, accountants, politicians and anyone else who has studied our markets today 
agrees that we are in a deep recession.  What they don’t agree on is what caused the 
recession.  Some say that accounting rules have amplified the crisis by “forcing” financial 
institutions to report financial assets at their fair values, and others say that bad decisions 
by top executives that have nothing to do with accounting led us here.  As a result, there 
has been significant government interference yet again due to companies becoming 
insolvent and companies filing for bankruptcy, or nearing it unless they get some kind of 
aid.  
 
Most of the critics’ opinion is that being “forced” to use fair value in reporting many of 
their financial assets is the reason for not only their demise but also for the global crisis 
that we face today.  A major critic, William Isaac, the FDIC Chairman has been 
extremely vocal, going so far as to say: 
"Mark-to-market accounting has been extremely and needlessly destructive of bank 
capital in the past year, and is a major cause of the current credit crisis and economic 
downturn." (Barr, http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/29/news/fair.value.fortune) 
 
Isaac and other critics argue that mark-to-market is mainly destructive because of its 
failure to figure out fair values of an asset/liability in an inactive market such as today’s, 
which is a market that distorts values to ones not reflective of the underlying economics 
(SEC Study, pg.1) . Critics also complain that this causes them to take a hit in their 
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earnings by holding securities that are not-sellable in the current marketplace and that the 
large write-downs can lead to the failure of long-standing financial institutions and 
further financial instability (Reason, Apr 6, 2009, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13436055?f=insidecfo).  
 
The problem with this ongoing debate is that it is difficult to think of an alternative to fair 
value accounting.  While many are asking for FAS 157 to be suspended, the SEC has 
made it clear that a suspension would only remove the guidance on how to determine fair 
value and not the accounting method itself.  What many critics may not realize is that 
their request for a suspension of the standard or even permanent elimination of it, would 
revert us back to historical costing which is even less relevant of a method that would 
increase investor uncertainty, whether the market for the asset is active or inactive (SEC 
Study, pg.16). If no one is buying securities, those securities historical cost does not 
reflect their value. 
 
Some critics of fair value even admit that there is no better alternative and that while fair 
value may bring losses to financial institutions, they shouldn’t complain. Thomas Jones, 
the Vice Chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board even admitted this: 
"It is a lousy system, but it is less lousy than any other system ... and I don't find that the 
people who criticize fair value have very good ideas for an alternative," (Leone, Oct 27, 
2008, pg.1) and when asked his opinion on historical costing he said “The only thing 
historical cost captures regarding financial instruments is an ‘accurate’ but ‘meaningless’ 
number” (Leone, Oct 27, 2008, pg.1). 
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Due to how vocal most critics have been, Congress has been presented with financial 
information which they have used as ammunition to fuel the argument that fair value 
accounting is the culprit in many of the instances of institutions suffering losses.  This has 
spurred the Congress to require the SEC to conduct a study on the Standard and a 
possible suspension of fair value accounting (SEC Study, pg.1).  As a result of the debate, 
there are two main questions that this paper will try to explore:  
1. Does fair value distort the values of financial assets and cause the    
financial crisis? 
2. Is this more of a political campaign to change accounting methods 
to suit financial institutions? 
 
Today’s crisis has even spread to many countries in Europe as many blame the standard 
setters for the current state of the global economy, and firmly believing that FAS 157 
promoted and amplified the situation. Is it fair to blame a GAAP accounting standard for 
the destruction of so much capital throughout the world though?  Europe is going through 
an equally deep recession, and to suggest that one accounting standard in particular, that 
serves as mere guidance on how to formulate an estimate is what I believe to be an 
unnecessarily harsh assertion. The following sections will provide an overview of FAS 
157 as it was written, as well as the study conducted by the SEC to determine whether it 
really caused the crisis. 
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FAS No. 157 
Fair value is ultimately an estimate of a price that a firm expects to sell an asset at, or 
realize a liability at.  It is used mainly to measure financial instruments such as a 
company’s shares, bonds, derivatives, etc.  The way to determine whether fair value 
should be used in measuring and reporting such an asset is by what kind of institution 
holds the asset/liability or what intention they have in holding the asset/liability (The 
Bond Market Association, pg.2).  For example a broker firm that has a large percentage 
of securities would use fair value for most of their assets, while a retail store might not.  
Using fair value in reporting certain assets and liabilities provides comparability in 
financial statements and provides investors with relevant and timely information. 
 
Although FAS 157 was first introduced on November 15, 2007, fair value was used for 
years before that to measure securities that are actively traded.  The changes in the fair 
value of such assets get recognized in the Income Statement, and this became known as 
“mark-to-market” accounting (SEC Study, pg.2).  Because mark-to-market requires a 
company to assign assets to a value based on what its selling price would be if it was sold 
today, it prevents businesses from assigning a value based on solely management’s 
discretion (Ahrens, Mar 12, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/economy-
watch/2009/03/mark-to-market_relaxation_with.html). 
 
FAS 157 was originally put into place only a year before all the turmoil it seems to have 
caused, and was essentially written to better define “fair value” and propose a framework 
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for measuring it in order to increase consistency in how companies measure fair value of 
their different assets and liabilities.  Since an enormous amount of judgment is required 
when measuring certain assets at fair value, Statement 157 serves as a helping hand.  In 
most cases assets that are measured simply using fair value unlike trading securities, 
change in their value is reported in Other Comprehensive Income which does not flow 
through the Income Statement unless impairment has occurred (SEC Study, pg.2). FAS 
157 also calls for more extensive disclosures in companies’ financial statements about 
how and which level of fair value were used to measure a specific asset/liability.  This 
statement builds on literature that was issued in prior statements such as FAS 133 and 
155. 
 
Fair value measurement as stated in FAS 157, Paragraph 7 is: 
“The transaction to sell the asset or liability is a hypothetical transaction at the 
measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that 
holds the asset or owes the liability.  Therefore the objective or a fair value 
measurement is to determine the price that would be received to sell the asset or 
paid to transfer the liability at the measurement date (exit price).” 
 
The measurement also assumes that the transaction takes place in the most advantageous 
market for the asset or liability.  The most advantageous market would be the market in 
which the seller could receive the highest amount and a market with the most activity in 
terms of the specific asset/liability.   
 
The assumptions that market participants make are referred to as inputs by the statement.  
There are two types of inputs: observable and unobservable.  Observable inputs are those 
based on market data that is obtained from an independent entity of the company 
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“selling” the asset.  Inputs that reflect a company’s own assumptions are unobservable 
because they are internal assumptions that may not necessarily be used by other 
companies in pricing the same asset.  FAS 157 requires that a company maximizes the 
number of observable inputs it uses and minimizes the unobservable inputs it uses.  This 
requirement is well aligned with the concept of independence in accounting and 
emphasizing the importance of building investor confidence.  If companies were allowed 
to use mostly or all unobservable inputs in pricing an asset, investors would not be able to 
determine whether or not sound judgment was used and confidence would be lost, and 
the company’s reputation would suffer. 
 
FAS 157 also creates a “fair value hierarchy” which separates the inputs that a company 
uses to measure fair value into three levels: 
 
Level 1: The highest priority is given to observable inputs in an active market, 
and these assets/liabilities fall into Level 1 Inputs.  An active market is 
categorized as one in which a transaction for the asset or liability occurs 
frequently enough to provide pricing information for it constantly.  This provides 
the most reliable fair value for the asset or liability (FASB 2006, pg.10). 
 
Level 2: Inputs that are observable directly or indirectly for the asset or liability 
and are not included within the Level 1 Inputs.  The inputs can be (FASB 2006, 
pg.11): 
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o quoted prices for a group of similar assets or liabilities in an active market 
whose individual prices may not be readily accessible 
o quoted prices for a group of assets/liabilities in a market with few 
transactions for them (i.e., inactive market)  
o inputs that are not categorized as quoted prices but are observable (i.e., 
interest rates) 
o market-corroborated inputs 
 
Level 3: The lowest priority is given to the assets/liabilities that have majority 
unobservable inputs and are considered Level 3.  Level 3 Inputs are those for 
which there is very little market activity.  Should the inputs be unobservable, the 
reporting entity must exercise sound judgment by using the best available date 
(whether it be the reporting entity’s own date) about what assumptions market 
participants will use in pricing the asset or liability.  If information about market 
participants’ assumptions becomes readily available and does not cause undue 
cost and effort on the reporting entity’s end, then that information should be used 
to adjust the previously developed value of the asset or liability (FASB 2006, 
pg.12). 
 
Much of the “problem” with FAS 157 arises when management is assessing what level an 
asset/liability they are measuring falls into, especially in an economy like today’s when 
normally active markets are inactive due to the lack of liquidity companies have. The 
statement was to be effective for fiscal year beginning November 15, 2007 and applied 
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prospectively from then on.  On that same day an article was written in the Wall Street 
Journal, “A FAS 157 Primer” that commented on the much misunderstood rule and 
attempted to explain it.  A very important part of the article read as such: 
“First, when it comes to the biggest banks and investment house — Goldman 
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Bank of America, to name a few — this is a 
non-event. All the big financial institutions adopted FAS 157 early, meaning 
they’ve been following it from either the start of 2007 or, in the case of most 
brokers, since the start of their current fiscal year, which began in December 
2006.” (Gongloff, Nov 15, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2007/11/15/a-
fas-157-primer). 
 
This means that FAS 157 wasn’t unexpected by the big players like the ones mentioned, 
it was even considered a “non-event”.  Large companies didn’t get hit with this new 
standard out of nowhere, they had been using it and had time to learn it and apply it 
properly.   
 
The most important change that was brought about by the inception of this standard as 
the article mentions was the guideline for how a company should measure fair value.  
Special attention should be given to the word “guideline”.  This standard didn’t introduce 
fair value for the first time in the accounting world- the term has been around for years.  
This standard seeks to help companies use proper judgment in valuing not only those 
assets that would fall under the Level 1 hierarchy, but also those assets under Level 3.  
What FAS 157 requires for assets that are considered Level 3 assets is a more specific 
breakdown of how fair value was determined for that asset.  This includes the 
assumptions that were made and the types of unobservable inputs that were used to make 
those assumptions.  In short, the statement is just forcing companies to give their reader’s 
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more information rather than asking companies to write assets down.  As David Reilly 
very precisely states: 
“FAS 157 isn’t forcing companies to write down prices because of the current 
market turmoil. It is more a case that the new disclosures will cause investors, and 
regulators, to ask a lot more questions if it looks like a company isn’t taking 
adequate write-downs (Gongloff).” 
 
Now that the economy is in recession and companies are filing for bankruptcy or asking 
for federal aid in forms of bail out money, everyone is placing blame.  While there are 
many factors we can blame, and it varies between industries, the financial sector has 
seemingly decided to blame FAS 157 for their turmoil.  It’s as if they want to recognize 
losses when its suitable for them to do so. 
 
SEC Study on Fair Value 
After much discussion and commentary on the standard from both critics and proponents, 
Section 133 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 mandated that the 
SEC conduct a study on FAS 157.  While the SEC yet again supported its position that 
the standard does not require the use of mark-to-market accounting but is instead a 
framework and guideline for those companies that do use it, it engaged in the study as the 
independent body that it is. 
 
The study took in consideration everyone’s views on what should be done- suspend, 
amend or keep the standard. The most vocal group was of course the critics of the 
standard.  The critics expressed their concerns that the standard’s implications led to our 
current situation by causing extreme volatility in the market place by forcing companies 
to incur significant and potentially inappropriate write-downs that “did not reflect the 
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current underlying economics of the securities”.  They also voiced their concerns that 
these write-downs would lead to a long-term financial instability for companies in the 
financial sector. 
 
Many other participants were just as vocal about their views on how the standard 
provides transparent and vital timely information calling out the financial institutions’ 
poor lending decisions, inadequate risk management and other internal factors for causing 
of the crisis.  The SEC’s study helped to refute many people’s claims that FAS 157 in its 
entirety caused our instable market conditions. 
 
The study examined the effects of fair value accounting on several different metrics.  
These metrics were: 
1. The effects on Financial Institutions’ Balance Sheets 
2. The impact on Bank Failures in 2008 
3. The impact on the Quality of Financial Information Available to 
Investors 
To examine the effects of fair value accounting standards and study these three metrics 
properly, the Staff focused on public entities that fit the categories of: banks, broker-
dealers, insurance companies, credit institutions and GSE’s, that all had readily available 
financial data.  They selected 70 issuers total for the study and grouped them into “large” 
and “small” based on their reported value of assets at the most recent fiscal year end, 
after which they tested what percentage of assets and liabilities were actually affected by 
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fair value in each type of company.  The complete findings of the study can be found on 
the SEC website (http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf). 
 
After analyzing small and large issuers, the study revealed that on an overall basis, fair 
value was used to measure less than majority of assets and liabilities of financial 
institutions.  It also revealed that specifically mark-to-market accounting, which 
recognized changes in fair value on the Income Statement, was used to measure an even 
smaller amount of assets and liabilities of financial institutions (SEC Study, pg.43).   
 
The main instruments that were measured by mark-to-market accounting were trading 
securities and derivatives.  While these instruments were only representative of a small 
number of the total population of most issuers’ assets, the impact of the changes in their 
values was significant on the institutions’ Income Statements.  Of all assets at fair value, 
only 9% were Level 3 assets, and of all liabilities, only 5% were Level 3.   Even though 
the percentages of these assets and liabilities were small relative to the total, the impact 
on equity was considered significant, with Level 3 instruments having a 10% impact at 
first quarter end of 2008 and 7% impact at third quarter end of 2008. 
 
Of the 50 analyzed issuers for Level 3 assets and liabilities, 22 had a negative impact on 
their income statement with losses ranging from 10 to 13 billion dollars.  The remaining 
28 issuers had either a positive impact (gains) or no impact on equity from Level 3 
instruments.  Industry wise, the most significant impact was seen in the broker-dealer 
industry as they have the largest amount of instruments that use mark-to-market 
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accounting as a measure.  Credit institutions had the least significant impact of all 
industries in the study (SEC Study, pg.90). 
 
The SEC Study also analyzed what factors were present in Income Statement changes 
that were unrelated to fair value accounting.  One of the main factors in the recent decline 
of institutions’ net income was provisional charges for loan losses; a large majority of 
these losses use a historical concept.  Also all industries, especially banks, were found to 
be significantly impacted by declining home prices, high rate of defaults on mortgage 
loans recently, and the general deterioration of the economy (SEC Study, pg.95). 
 
As a result, the findings of issuers that were sampled in the near-300 page study was that 
the general lending practices of banks is what has had the most significant impact on 
financial institutions’ incomes.  Therefore while fair value does measure certain 
instruments, its impact does not distort the values of financial assets to the point that we 
can attribute fair value as the cause of the crisis (SEC Study, pg.95). 
 
In conclusion, the SEC still does not advise a suspension or elimination of the Standard, 
but does believe that certain improvements could be made.  Some of the improvements 
that they agreed could be beneficial: 
o The need for additional guidance on how to apply the Standard in an 
inactive market 
o A bigger push for education as to how to properly apply reasonable 
judgment when making a fair value estimate 
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o Enhance disclosure and presentation requirements. 
 
Survey 
As we endure the ups and downs of this recession and try to find ways to come out of it 
stronger and with the knowledge to not let it happen again, people are voicing their 
opinions louder than ever.  Because of the coverage that has surrounded FASB , I have 
conducted a survey of the opinions of over 200 people by examining comment letters to 
the SEC (http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-573/4-573.shtml), as well as reading a number 
of newspaper and magazine articles in which people voiced their opinion on the Standard.  
Indeed these sources are imperfect and partially incomplete, but provide a good insight as 
to what opinions certain affiliations hold.   
 
My presupposition when conducting this survey was that the critics of fair value would 
be made up of mostly financial institutions, their associations and their political 
supporters while those who support fair value would be investors, their associations, 
standard setters and auditors.  The documentation of my study can be found in Appendix 
A and further explanation on how the results were tallied is provided below.  It is also 
important to note that in my examination of opinions, many times a subject did not 
precisely state “Suspend” or “Keep” mark-to-market accounting; in the case that a subject 
did not explicitly state their opinion, I was compelled to exercise my own judgment as to 
what their opinion was on the matter.   
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In order to properly tally the results of the survey I had to make several assumptions.  
These assumptions were necessary as many people, especially in the SEC Comment 
Letters, did not identify themselves or their affiliation. Because of this the respondents 
that are featured in the “Other” category are many, and it is actually the second largest 
category of respondents.  This category included the people that did not identify their 
affiliations, or those that did not fit into any of the other categories.  The most prominent 
professions in the “Other” category were Lawyers and the rest was majority people who 
did not identify their affiliation or credentials. 
 
The remaining respondents were categorized as such: 
o In the “Executive” category were bankers, business executives, and their 
business associations such as the “American Bankers Association” 
o In the “Investor” category were investors, analysts, CFA’s, CFP’s, 
brokers, consumers, and their relative investor associations such as the 
“Council of Institutional Investors” 
o In the “CPA” category were people who identified themselves solely as a 
CPA, or partners/managers in an accounting firm 
o In the “Standard Setters” category were chairmen, accountants and 
members of FASB, the SEC, IASB and etc, or members of an accounting 
association such as the “AICPA” 
o In the “Academic” category were professors, students any anyone who 
solely identified themselves by their credentials such as “Ph.D. or MBA” 
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o In the “Politician” category are political figures like senators, house 
representatives and lobbyists 
 
 
The findings of my study were such: 
Table 1: Analysis of Respondents Opinions 
Category Total Respondents % to keep FV % to suspend FV 
Executive 83 24% 76% 
Investor 21 57% 43% 
CPA 23 39% 61% 
Standard Setter 20 90% 10% 
Academic 29 48% 52% 
Politician 17 6% 94% 
Other 55 22% 78% 
 
Even though the “Politician” category is the smallest of all categories in the survey, I still 
believe that it proves a very crucial point- Politicians’ stance (as observed from this 
study) on the root of the problems in the economy is that accounting is the culprit.  It is 
politicians that vote on the most important topics regarding our economy today and it is 
politicians that voted on the bail-out package to help our economy to turn around.  As a 
part of passing the bail our package though, they mandated that the SEC “study” FAS 
157 and gave them permission to suspend the fair value rules for companies suffering 
from it.  While the Stabilization Act did not require that the SEC suspend the rule, its 
language strongly suggested that the rule is in fact hurting the economic situation which 
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is why the study was sought.  Because the SEC answers to Congress, if Congress 
ultimately said to suspend fair value, the SEC would have to do so.  As articles are 
written every day about the topic, many people don’t even mention the SEC and its role 
in suspending the rule but instead they say things like “Still, bankers had their hopes 
dashed the last time Congress waved the possibility that fair-value rules could face the 
knife” (Johnson, Feb 5, 2009, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13087850?f=search).   
 
The table above already shows that majority of CEO’s and politicians both agree on 
suspending Fair Value, I conducted a test where I grouped the “Executives” and 
“Politicians” into “Group 1”, “CPA” and “Standard Setters” into “Group 2” and 
“Investors” into “Group 3”.  This will test two things: 
o Whether the debate is a big political campaign to change accounting 
methods to suit financial institutions (Between Group 1 and 2) 
o Where the group with directly opposite interests of executives (Group 3) 
agrees with Group 1 or Group 2 
The significance of Group 3 is that investors rely on auditor’s to present them with 
reliable information about an institution’s financial standing.  This will test whether or 
not after such an upheaval from executives, they still side with auditors and standard 
setters. 
 This was the outcome: 
Table 2: Summary of Respondents in Two Groups 
Category Total respondents % to keep FV % to suspend FV 
Group 1 100 21% 79% 
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Group 2 43 63% 37% 
Group 3 21 57% 43% 
 
The table above also shows that when executives and politicians are grouped together, 
they are even more in agreement that Fair Value should be suspended.  This does not 
surprise me, and stays true to my hypothesis.  It also shows that majority of Group 2 and 
3 agree that Fair Value should not be suspended.  Therefore this shows that this is very 
likely a political campaign to change the accounting method in order to please financial 
institutions.  Group 3, which is made up of investors, who are directly affected by an 
institution’s gains and losses, still have a majority vote that financial institutions should 
keep using Fair Value because it provides reliable information.  As far as Group 2’s 
apparent disagreement with Group 1, that was expected.  But what is important about 
Group 2 in the table above is that it shows that Investors still believe that standard setters 
know and independent auditors ultimately work for the interest of the Investor. 
 
The table shows that there is a large disagreement between the groups. “Group 1” is by 
far the largest group of the three, meaning that Executives and Politicians have been the 
most vocal about the effects of fair value.  However, even being the largest group, there 
does seem to be disagreement between them and the other two groups on whether or not 
to keep Fair Value.   
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Another interesting fact from this survey is that executives such as CitiGroup’s Director 
and former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, voted to suspend Fair Value, along with 
Marc Foster, VP of Investments at UBS, when in fact their companies gave money to 
politicians like House GOP Eric Cantor. who have the power to vote for or against fair 
value accounting.  Bank of America also sent out $24,500 (collectively) to House 
Majority Leader Steny Hoyer and several members of the House and Senate banking 
panels.  Now what politician would want to go against the interest of such giant 
corporations- the same corporations that support them in their campaigns? (Isikoff, 
Maron, Mar 30, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/190363). 
 
While it may not be stated explicitly, the language of the literature written in the wake of 
this economic crisis suggest time after time that first and foremost it is Congress and the 
politicians that make up Congress who blame accounting for this crisis. To reiterate a 
point made earlier in this paper, when a political figure such as John McCain (who also 
voted to suspend Fair Value) backs the major corporations when they dually agree that 
mark-to-market is solely responsible for the major upsets in our recent economy, the 
public will ultimately be predisposed to the idea that accounting regulators are actually 
the ones that made poor decisions and ultimately led us to this crisis.  But are politicians 
the best ones to judge what our economy’s faults were especially when they have a 
conflict of interest? If they were to be held to the same independence standards as 
auditors, they would surely not be the first pick for making a non-biased decision on such 
a crucial topic. 
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The crisis overseas 
In Europe, where politicians like French president Nicolas Sarkozy have also decided to 
place blame on Fair Value Accounting, the situation is “more complex” because 
standards are set by the International Accounting Standards Board.  Indeed a solution that 
many proponents of fair value accounting have suggested in the case of politics having 
too much say in terms of how and when to apply accounting standards, is a convergence 
of GAAP and IFRS, which will in turn make us regulated by the IASB.  And in fact, the 
top level executives of the IASB defend fair value and believe that it is here to stay.  As 
IASB Chairman David Tweedie says: “Fair value in a time of crisis can in effect 
exacerbate the concerns about a situation. But on balance, fair value keeps the situation 
honest” (Johnson, Mar 19, 2008, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10902771?f=search).   
 
Tom Jones, the IASB’s vice chairman backs Tweedie when he states in an interview with 
Alan Murray, that fair value accounting may not be perfect, but not only is there no better 
alternative, there pretty much no alternatives.  To say that fair value accounting is bad 
accounting and it played a key role in deteriorating our markets is unfair, especially as 
many opponents don’t actually have a better proposal for valuing these assets and 
liabilities.  In fact what it comes down to, as Jones mentions in his interview, is that 
people want “wishful accounting” and would ultimately only be satisfied if they could 
value an asset/liability at what they think is its value is (Murray, Oct 2008, pg.25). 
 
A major critic of fair value has been Martin Sullivan, CEO of one of the most deeply hurt 
companies in the economy, AIG.  As many critics of the standard agree with him, firms 
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like AIG are daunted by the task of valuing extremely complex instruments.  What he 
isn’t saying is that the SEC isn’t the one creating these complex instruments, but instead 
companies in the course of their transactions create the new complex instrument and 
transaction and the SEC has to regulate by coming up with a fair way to value that 
instrument.  And of course when a standard comes out that “forces” you to take losses in 
a market unsuitable for these instruments for a period of time, the CEO’s get upset, and 
when enough companies complain about the rules instead of taking responsibility for 
their own actions in other aspects of their business that led them to the bad financial 
position they are in, the economy begins to suffer.  When the economy begins to suffer as 
drastically as it is today, politicians get involved, and the blame goes to the people who 
initially wanted to help resolve a complex issue and help companies, the accountants. 
Perhaps mark to market isn’t perfect, but in the midst of placing blame on a rule, not 
many have sought to come up with a superior approach that they are happy with. As 
Jones states in his interview when discussing another controversial standard that the 
IASB is dealing with right now: “We can’t please everybody. It’s going to be a fight”. 
(Murray, Oct 2008, pg.27). 
 
Conclusion 
To clearly answer my two questions in the beginning of the paper: 
1. No, fair value does not distort values of financial assets enough to cause a crisis, 
but there may in fact be some valuable adjustments that could be made (some 
have now been made as mentioned previously, such as providing more guidance 
on how to measure assets at fair value in an inactive market) to FAS 157.  It is 
important to realize that this does not mean that these adjustments should be 
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made to please those institutions that are complaining about the effects they 
believe fair value accounting has had on their income.  In fact an amendment to 
an accounting statement should only be made if the SEC, FASB, and practicing 
auditors take into account the public’s concern, study the standard and provide a 
truly non-biased decision on what should be done. 
2. Yes, it does seem that most of the things said about how mark-to-market 
accounting is the culprit in our financial crisis were part of a political campaign 
to change the method to one that suits financial institutions.  A significant amount 
of evidence has been presented in this paper to prove that politics are becoming 
too intertwined in the dealings of major corporations. 
 
My recommendation is that we should not allow politics to be involved in standard 
setting at all.  The fact is that executives will never be 100% satisfied with 
accounting standards and what that means for their company’s income.  While they 
have the government to run to, who is in charge of the SEC, they are somewhat 
protected when the economy takes such a huge fall.  The real danger is that some 
critics are so set in their ways right now, that they are even proposing that a new 
regulating body be formed that takes the SEC’s place. 
“Thus, in the middle of this financial crisis, lawmakers are focusing on the 
politics and intentions of rulemaking rather than what the standards tell us about a 
business's financial health.” (Johnson, Mar 17, 2009, 
http://www.cfo.com/blogs/index.cfm/l_detail/13313690?f=blog_mostrecentpost) 
 
This quote incorporates the purpose of this paper very well.  Should corporations be 
allowed to report values that are “rosier-than-real” when behind the curtain is actually an 
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asset that is worth virtually nothing?  No they shouldn’t be allowed to report such results 
(Johnson, Mar 17, 2009http://www.cfo.com/blogs/index.cfm/l_detail/13313690?f=blog 
_mostrecentpost).  The only way that we can achieve a standard setting process that is 
truly independent is to advance in our efforts to converge GAAP and IFRS standards.  
This way we would be governed by the IASB; a body completely independent of a single 
country’s government and its direction and influence in how to write accounting 
standards. 
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Appendix A. 
List of people in the survey 
Name  Affiliation  Position   Opinion 
on 
FASB 
157 
Classification 
Jeremy 
Hosking1 
 Marathon Asset Management  Director  Flawed Executive 
            
Edward 
Padilla2 
 NorthMarg Capital  CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
Alfred King3  Marshall &Stevens  Vice Chairman  Flawed Executive 
            
Barney Frank4  Mass Gov.  Rep.(d)  Flawed Politician 
            
Douglas 
Charmichael5 
 Baruch College  Acct Professor  Override Academic 
            
Joe Bartlett5  Sullivan & Worcester  Lawyer  Flawed Other 
            
Edward 
Yingling6 
 American Bankers Associations  President & CEO  Override 
 
Executive 
        
Edward 
Mahoney7 
 Council of Institutional Investors  General Counsel & CPA  Keep Investor 
            
John 
Boehner8 
 Ohio  House Minority Leader (r )  Flawed Politician 
            
Larry Wojcik8  Past chairman of Illinois CPA Society  Lawyer  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Ira Solomon8  University of Illinois  Acct Professor  Keep Academic 
            
Tom Jones9  IASB  Vice Chairman  Keep Standard Setter 
            
John Griffith-
Jones10 
 KPMG UK  Senior Partner  Keep CPA 
            
Jean Francois 
Lepetit11 
 French National Accounting Board  Chairman  Flawed Standard Setter 
            
Etienne  PwC  Partner  Flawed CPA 
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Boris11 
            
Didier 
Marteau11 
 European School of Management  Professor  Flawed Academic 
            
Mark 
LaMonte12 
 Moody's  Sr. Vice President  Flawed Executive 
            
James 
Quigley13 
 Deloitte & Touche  Chief Executive  Keep CPA 
            
Hugh 
Shields14 
 Institute of Chartered Accts. Scotland  Chief Economic Adviser  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Oonagh 
Macdonald15 
   International Consultant  Keep Other 
            
Darrell Duffie16  Stanford University  Professor  Keep Academic 
            
Don 
Stammer17 
 INGIM  Chair  Keep Executive 
            
Cindy 
Fornelli18 
 Center for Audit Quality  Exec Director  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Robert 
Rubin18 
 CitiGroup  Director, Former US 
Treasury Secretary 
 Suspend Executive 
        
Jeff 
Mahoney18 
 Council of Institutional Investors  General Councel  Keep Investor 
            
David Dodge19  Bank of Canada  Former Governor  Repeal Executive 
            
Nick LePan19  Canadian Public Accountability Board  Chairman  Keep Standard Setter 
        
Sue 
Luedolph20 
 SA Institute of Chartered Accountants  Director  Keep Standard Setter 
            
William 
Isaac21 
 Former FDIC Chair    Repeal Executive 
            
Marc Carney22  Bank of Canada  Governor  Repeal Executive 
            
Samuel 
DiPiazza23 
 PwC SA  CEO  Keep CPA 
            
Aubrey 
Patterson24 
 BankCorp South  Chairman and CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
Ray Ball24  University of Chicago  Professor  Keep Academic 
            
David 
Larson24 
 Duff & Phelps  Managing Director  Keep Executive 
            
Vincent 
Colman24 
 PwC  Partner  Keep CPA 
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Spencer 
Bachus25 
 Representative  Alabama (r )  Suspend Politician 
            
Charles 
Schumer26 
 Senator  NY (d)  Suspend Politician 
            
Russell 
Golden26 
 FASB  Director  Keep Standard Setter 
            
David 
Tweedie27 
 IASB  Chairman  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Alex 
Dumortier28 
   CFA  Flawed Investor 
            
Dane Mott29  JP Morgan  CPA  Keep CPA 
        
Sarah Dean29   JP Morgan   CPA   Keep 
 
CPA 
        
Dennis Nally30  PwC  Chairman  Keep 
 
CPA 
        
John McCain30  Senator (R )    Suspend Politician 
            
David 
Einhorn12 
 Greenlight Capital  President  Suspend Executive 
            
Nicolas 
Sarkozy31 
 President  France  Suspend Politician 
            
David 
Cameron31 
 Leader of the Conservative Party  United Kingdom  Suspend  Politician 
            
Peter Elwin31  Cazenove  Analyst  Keep Investor 
            
Joseph 
Grundfest32 
 Stanford Law School  Professor  Flawed Academic 
            
Susan Bies32  Committee on Improving Financial 
Reporting 
 Member  Suspend Standard Setter 
        
Jamie Dimon33  JP Morgan  CEO  Keep Executive 
            
David Zion33   Author of Credit Suisse Study         Keep Other 
            
Amit 
Varshney33 
  Author of Credit Suisse Study         Keep Other 
            
Christopher 
Cornette33 
 Author of Credit Suisse Study     Keep Other 
            
Kip 
Weissman16 
 Luse Gorman Pomerenk & Schick  
Financial Law Firm 
 Partner  Flawed Other 
           
Charlie 
McCreevy34 
 European Commissioner     Suspend Politician 
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Christopher 
Dodd35 
 Senator  CT  Suspend Politician 
            
Paul Volcker35  Economic Advisor to Obama     Suspend Politician 
            
Mary 
Shapiro36 
 SEC  Chairman  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Paul B.W. 
Miller37 
 University of Colorado  Acct Professor  Keep Academic 
            
Stephen 
Schwarzman38 
 Blackstone Group  Co-founder  Suspend Executive 
            
Henry M. 
Paulson, Jr.38 
  US Treasury   Secretary   Keep Politician 
            
Cindy Ma39  Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin 
Mergers&Acquistions, Advisory 
 Managing Director  Keep Executive 
            
Chuck 
Maimbourg39 
 KeyBank  Director of Acct Policy  Suspend Executive 
            
Bruce 
Wasserstein40 
 Lazard Financial Advisory Firm  Chairman and CEO  Keep Executive 
            
Henry B. 
Gonzalez41 
 Texas Democrat     Suspend Politician 
        
Paul Boyle42  UK Financial Reporting Council  Chief Executive  Keep Standard Setter 
        
Michael Izza42  Institute of Chartered Accountants  Head  Keep Standard Setter 
            
Gerrit Zalm43  IASB  Chairman of Trustees  Keep Standard Setter 
        
George I. 
Victor44 
 Holtz Rubenstein Reminick LLP  Partner on quality control  Keep CPA 
            
Lynn E. 
Turner45 
 Former SEC Chief Accountant     Keep Standard Setter 
            
Martin 
Sullivan45 
 AIG  Former CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
J. Edward 
Ketz45 
 Pennsylvania State University  Professor  Keep Academic 
            
Charles W. 
Mulford45 
 Georgia Institute of Technology  Accounting Expert  Keep Academic 
         
*Larissa R. 
Taylor 
    CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Brooke Lively  Lindus Advisors, Inc.  Equity Analyst  Flawed Investor 
            
*Lawrence J. 
White 
 NYU  Professor  Keep Academic 
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*Chester 
Culver 
 Iowa  Governor  Suspend Politician 
            
*Jeff 
Diermeier 
  CFA Institute   President and CEO   Keep Investor 
            
*Barbara 
Roper 
 Consumer Federation of America  Director of Investor 
Protection 
 Keep Investor 
            
*Liz Murall  Investment Management Association  Director of Corp Gov. & 
Reporting 
 Keep Investor 
            
*Paul Stevens  Investment Company Institute  President & CEO  Keep Investor 
            
*Dorothy 
Jaworski 
  First Federal of Bucks County   CEO   Suspend  Executive 
                       
*Ann Grochala   ICBA   Vice President   Flawed Executive 
                       
*Robert E. 
Denham 
  Financial Accounting Foundation   Chairman   Keep Standard Setter 
                       
*Laura 
Cloherty 
  WesCorp   Controller   Flawed Executive 
                       
*Jon Hale   Partnership Consultants, Inc.   President   Flawed Executive 
                       
*Vern Montroy   Community Security Bank   VP & CFO   Repeal Executive 
                       
*Barbara 
Walker 
  Independent Bankers Of Colorado   Executive Director   Suspend Executive 
                       
*Thomas 
Bailey 
  Penn. Association of Comm. Bankers   Chairman   Suspend Executive 
                       
*Kurt Davis   The Davis Law Firm   Esq.   Suspend Other 
                       
*Christopher 
Williston 
  Ind. Bankers Association of Texas   President & CEO   Suspend Executive 
            
*Jarrett Sage  Missouri Independent Bankers Ass.  Executive Director  Suspend Executive 
            
*Thomas 
Knorr 
    CPA  Suspend CPA 
            
*Kraig 
Lounsberry 
 Comm. Bankers Assoc. of Illinois  Senior VP  Suspend Executive 
            
*Art Michelleti    Economist/Inv. Strategist  Suspend Other 
            
*David A 
Costello 
 NASBA  President & CEO  Keep Standard Setter 
            
*Brittany 
Gichini 
 University of Maryland  Student  Keep Academic 
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*Colin J. 
Haslam 
 University of Hertfordshire  Professor  Suspend Academic 
        
*Dwayne 
Hines 
 Idaho State Tax Commission  Senior Appraiser  Flawed Other 
            
*Susan K. 
Maller 
    CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Gilbert F. 
Viets 
 ATA Holdings  Ex-CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Gilles 
Zancanaro 
 Bouygues  Corporate Director Acct.  Flawed Executive 
            
*Olivier 
Ramond 
 Dauphine University  Finance Professor  Flawed Academic 
            
*Dottie 
Cunningham 
 Commercial Mortgage Securities 
Association 
 CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Urooj Khan  University of Washington  Ph.D. Candidate  Flawed Academic 
            
*Don M. 
Bjerke 
 Canada  Retired Professional 
Engineer 
 Flawed Other 
            
*Richard 
Murray  
 US Chamber of Commerce  Chairman  Flawed Politician 
            
*Steve Bartlett  Financial Services Roundtable  President and CEO  Flawed Politician 
            
*Robert 
Gordon 
 Policy Development and Research Property 
and Casualty Insurers Association of 
America 
 Sr. VP  Flawed Executive 
            
*Rob Nichols  Financial Services Forum  President and COO  Flawed Politician 
            
*Michael M. 
Monahan 
 American Council of Life Insurers  Director, Acct Policy  Flawed Executive 
            
*Kevin M. 
Blakely 
 Risk Management Association  President and CEO  Executive 
         
Keep 
 
 
*Niall H. 
O'Malley 
 Blue Point Investment Management  Portfolio Manager  Flawed Executive 
            
*R. Cromwell 
Coulson 
 Pink OTC Markets Inc.  CEO  Keep Executive 
            
*David 
Risgaard 
 North Star Asset Management  CFA  Flawed Investor 
      
*Mark 
Schneider 
      Keep Other 
            
*Donald J. 
Carroll, Jr. 
 Xylos Corporation  CPA, Controller  Flawed Executive 
            
*Vincent   Mtax       Flawed Other 
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Rogers 
            
*Deborah L. 
Bianucci 
 BAI CFO Roundtable  President and CEO  Keep Executive 
            
*Patrick J. 
Straka 
 CIB Marine Bancshares  CIO and Economist  Suspend Executive 
            
*Richard 
Sconyers 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Alexandra 
Hamilton 
      Keep Other 
            
*Richard A. 
Dorfman 
 Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta  President and CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Donald M. 
Rembert 
 Rembert Pendleton Jackson  CFP  Flawed Other 
            
*Dan J. 
Nguyen 
   CFA, MBA  Suspend Investor 
            
*Shad 
Lofgreen 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Wayne R. 
Landsman 
 University of North Carolina  Professor Acct.  Keep Academic 
            
*Peter Quigley  Renvyle Partners, LLC  Managing Member  Suspend Executive 
            
*Douglas K. 
Levin 
 Levin & Hu, LLP  CPA, MBT  Flawed CPA 
            
*C. Edward 
Chaplin 
 MBIA, INC.  President and CEO  Keep Executive 
            
*Mary Mitchell 
Dunn 
 Credit Union National Association  SVP   Flawed Executive 
            
*Rudolf Bless  Credit Suisse  Managing Director, CAO  Keep Executive 
            
*Patrick D. 
Ackerman 
 Credit Suisse  Director  Keep Executive 
        
*Stephen P. 
Lowe 
 Towers Perrin  Managing Director  Supports 
MTM 
Executive 
            
*Peter D. 
Needleman 
 Towers Perrin  Managing Director  Supports 
MTM 
Executive 
            
*Prakash 
Shimpi 
 Towers Perrin  Managing Principal  Support 
MTM 
Executive 
            
*Dickson 
Cannon 
  Cannon Company         Flawed Other 
            
*Donna Fisher  American Bankers Association  SVP  Flawed Executive 
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*Martha L. 
Frye 
 Nationwide Insurance  SVP and CAO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Norman 
Smith 
 Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co.  VP and Controller  Flawed Executive 
            
*Kathryn E. 
Brick 
 US Central Federal Credit Union  SVP, CEP  Flawed Executive 
            
*Sharon Raz  Boston University  Graduate Law Student  Keep Academic 
            
*Isabel 
Gutierrez 
 Boston University  Graduate Law Student  Keep Academic 
            
*Lukas 
Huesler 
 Boston University  Graduate Law Student  Keep Academic 
           
*Roy Dias  Boston University  Graduate Law Student  Keep Academic 
            
*Mariah C. 
Webinger 
 University of Nebraska     Suspend Academic 
            
*David Smith  University of Nebraska     Suspend Academic 
            
*Philippe 
Bordenave 
 BNP Paribas  CFP  Keep Other 
            
*Dr. Nigel 
Sleigh-
Johnson 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants England  Executive Director  Keep Standard Setter 
            
*Mirianne J. 
Tissier 
 International Valuation Standards 
Committee 
 Executive Director  Keep Standard Setter 
            
*Richard 
Whiting 
 Financial Services Roundtable  Executive director and 
general counsel 
 Flawed Executive 
            
*David G. 
Tittsworth 
 Investment Adviser Association  Executive Director  Keep Investor 
            
*John A. 
Courson 
 Mortage Bankers Association  COO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Christianna 
Wood 
 Calpers  Senior Investment Officer  Keep Executive 
           
 
*George Diehr  Calpers Board Member  Ph.D.  Keep Academic 
            
*Walter Urban       Flawed Other 
            
*Arnold Dicke  New World Actuaries  FSA, President  Flawed Executive 
            
*Steven K. 
Hazen 
   Lawyer  Flawed Other 
            
*James J.  Georgetown University  Finance Professor  Flawed Academic 
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Angel 
            
*Kurt Paul 
Ramin 
   CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Thomas 
Graham 
 SunCorp Corporate Credit Union  President and CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Khadid 
Gueye 
      Keep Other 
            
*Delphine 
Tchingambu 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Robert 
Traficanti 
 Citigroup  Deputy Controller  Flawed Executive 
            
*Roger D. 
Lundstrom 
 Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago  VP and CFO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Robert L. 
Benson 
   CPA  Keep CPA 
            
*Nigel Hyde  Totem  Managing Director  Keep Executive 
            
*Marcus 
Schuler 
 Markit  Managing Director  Keep Executive 
            
*Stephen T. 
Smith 
 Conectiv Energy  Controller  Keep Executive 
            
*Ruth A. Bjork       Flawed Other 
            
*Barry C. 
Melancon 
 AICPA  President and CEO  Keep Standard Setter 
            
*Kurt N. 
Schacht 
 CFA Institute  Managing Director  Keep Investor 
            
*Patrick M. 
Finnegan 
 CFA Institute  Director  Keep Investor 
            
*John Koster  Providence Health & Services  President & CEO  Suspend Executive 
            
*Teresa 
McAllister 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Fred Lane       Suspend Other 
            
*MaryAnn 
Bucalo 
      Keep Other 
            
*Appraisal Institute and American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers   Keep Other 
            
*Betty 
Meredith 
 InFRE Retirement Resource Center  Managing Member  Flawed Executive 
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*Stephen W. 
Hamilton 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Urs Fischer       Economist   Keep Other 
            
*Charles T. 
Steinmetz 
 Elliott Company  Treasurer  Flawed Executive 
            
*Arthur T. 
Anderson 
   Investor  Flawed Investor 
            
*Dave Spicer       Flawed Other 
            
*Robert F. 
Muth 
  Banklogic.net         Flawed Other 
            
*James M. 
Dupont 
  Independent Software Developer         Flawed Other 
            
*Gregory H. 
Smith 
 Domino Foods, Inc.  CPA, SVP  Flawed Executive 
            
*Tom Schryer   ASA         Flawed Other 
            
*Columbia Business School  Flawed Academic 
            
*Christopher 
Matteson 
  Integrated Planning Strategies, LLC         Relax  Other 
            
*Frank 
Keating 
 American Council of Life Insurers  President, CEO  Modify Executive 
            
*Brian H. 
Tarasuk 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Roger W. 
Jeremiah 
   Commercial Banker  Flawed Executive 
            
*Philip Varley  The Barrington Group Inc.  President  Flawed Executive 
            
*Scott Evans  Asset Management of TIAA-CREF  Executive VP  Keep Executive 
            
*G. Peter 
Wilson 
 Boston College  Chair in Accounting  Suspend Academic 
            
*Jason 
Fastiggi 
 Scoggin Capital Management  CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Jeffrey A. 
Miller 
   Investment Manager  Suspend Executive 
            
*Melissa 
Ashley 
 Corporate One federal Credit Union  VP, CFO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Donald 
Gorton 
 Wayne State University  Emeritus Professor Acct  Flawed Academic 
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*G. Alex 
Morfesis 
  Trusted Capital Solutions, LLC         Flawed Other 
            
*Brad Miller  Association of Corporate Credit Unions  Executive Director  Suspend Executive 
            
*David Cox  The Bradbury Co. Inc.  President  Suspend Executive 
            
*Jason 
Edgtton 
    International Investor  Keep Investor 
            
*John Ryan  University of Wollongong     Flawed Academic 
            
*John G. 
Black 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Onex P. 
Evans 
 Alpharetta  CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Marc Foster  UBS  VP Investments  Eliminate Executive 
            
*Melissa 
Wardell 
 Southwest Corporate Federal Credit Union  SVP  Flawed Executive 
            
*Dan Steward    CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*William 
Waller 
 University of Arizona  Ph.D.  Suspend Academic 
            
*Jason Ziegler   Highland Capital Management         Suspend Other 
            
*Carl     CFA  Suspend Investor 
            
*Chris 
Etheridge 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Michael 
Sigmon 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Susan M. 
Saidens 
   CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*James R. 
Vetter 
   CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*David V. 
Anderson 
 Republican Candidate for General 
Assembly 
 Politician  Flawed Politician 
            
*Barbara 
Leavitt 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Jeffery B. 
Cross 
   Investor  Eliminate Investor 
            
*Gunther 
Steinbacher 
      Keep Other 
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*Todd M. 
Adams 
 Members United Federal Credit Union  CFO  Flawed Executive 
            
*John L. 
Petersen 
 Fefer Peterssen  CPA, JD  Flawed CPA 
            
*Karsten Von 
Kleist 
   Economist  Flawed Other 
            
*William King    CPA  Flawed CPA 
            
*Lewis Murray     Investor  Suspend Investor 
            
*Mark Haslem               Suspend Other 
            
*David W. 
Kent 
 Association of Cost Engineers  Member  Suspend Other 
            
*Sue Olson       Suspend Other 
            
*John 
Carmony 
   Investor  Suspend Investor 
            
*Louis 
LeGuyader 
      Flawed Other 
            
*Jason B. 
Piper 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Chris Lane     CPA  Suspend CPA 
            
*David Hodge  Gimbal Capital Management  CCO  Suspend Executive 
            
*Richard J. 
Casey 
 Square 1 Bank  CEO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Timothy L. 
Baldwin 
 Emile Banks & Associates  Lawyer  Flawed Other 
            
*Nancy 
Younger 
      Keep Other 
            
*James E. 
Kelley 
 Eagle National Bank  CFO  Flawed Executive 
            
*Jay 
Michalowski 
 Sleeping Bear Partners  Principal  Keep Executive 
            
*Ray Walker       Flawed Other 
            
*Patrick 
Keating 
    Ph. D.  Flawed Academic 
            
*Mark 
Poweski 
      Suspend Other 
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*Ron 
Armstrong 
      Suspend Other 
            
*David 
Harmon 
      Suspend Other 
            
*Michael P. 
Durante 
 Western Reserve Capital Management  Managing Partner  Flawed Executive 
            
*Paul 
Simeanuer 
 Council of Institutional Investors  Analyst  Keep Investor 
            
*Steve 
Grossman 
      Suspend Other 
 
*All of these respondents’ opinions came from comment letters that they sent to the SEC 
found on the website: <http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-573/4-573.shtml> 
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